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ABSTRACT
As a result of dramatic growth in the capabilities of
C4I systems, commanders have an immense amount of
information available to them. Increased bandwidths and
improved speeds in our communications systems can overload
our commanders with data. One solution is improved methods
of presenting information to the commander.
The same advances that threaten to overload the
commander with data provide a solution. Improved technology
now allows us to present the information in an easily
assimilated graphical, 3D or '"picture" ' form. These new
types of displays can present the information in an
intuitive style that eases the commander's cognitive
workload and speeds comprehension. Recent studies comparing
different types of displays support this theory.
Because commanders in airborne command and control
platforms require a detailed understanding of a three
dimensional environment, they should adopt some type of 3D
display. Perspective or 2%D displays are not perfect for
absolutely every situation the commander will face; but the
added understanding of the action, tactics and intentions of
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This thesis investigates new and improved C2 decision
aids for airborne tactical and operational commanders. The
specific focus is on the E-2C Hawkeye
.
As a result of dramatic growth in the capabilities of
C4I systems, commanders have an immense amount of
information available to them. Increased bandwidths and
improved speeds in our communications systems can overload
our commanders with data. One solution is improved methods
of presenting information to the commander.
Among other things, a C2 system should present the
information in an easily assimilated form. Displays should
present the information in an intuitive style that eases the
commander's cognitive workload and speeds comprehension.
In fact, as speeds and volumes of information of data
continue to increase, the limiting factor of the Hawkeye as
a C2 platform becomes not the human but the human machine
interface
.
Depictions in science fiction movies and novels of
humans with a receptacle in their head through which the
computer and the human communicate would be the ideal HMI
.
Our goal is to become as close to this ideal as possible.
All calculations and conversions that do not require human
judgment or decisions are done by the computer. This
greatly reduces the cognitive load of translating and
manipulating less processed information and data. By doing
XI
this much, more of his mental ability is available to
maintain situational awareness and make key tactical and
operational decisions. The focus of C2 system designers
should be on how to more efficiently instill understanding,
not improve how to show data or information.
In that aim, the use of text should be limited. A
picture says a thousand words is still true today, and
recent studies in cognitive analysis shows evidence for why
this is true.
As computers become faster and more powerful, we can
depict the scene graphically, even in three dimensions, and
instantly provide the user a firm understanding of his
environment
.
Recent experiments comparing perspective and other
forms of three dimensional displays with current two
dimensional displays show better performance with the 3D
displays. A greater reliance on the graphical
representation may allow the user to manipulate the picture,
for example, use a different viewpoint, take a vertical or
horizontal slice, rotate the world slowly and perhaps back
and forth to glean more detailed relative information. For
the more rare case of highest accuracy, the text -based
information can still be viewed. The key is that the user
has the option of using the more easily digestible picture
and resorting to text only when necessary. Omitting the
pictorial capability because it lacks exactness for specific
tasks robs the user of understanding in cases where text is
XII
not necessary, or the picture is more quickly and easily
assimilated into situational awareness.
The results of this thesis should convince the
operators of C2 platforms that the three dimensional display
is the best choice now in the evolution towards the ideal
HMI.
The following is a list of assumptions made:
• Speed and bandwidth increases will continue to
provide more and more information to commanders.
• Sensor sophistication and capabilities will
continue to improve resulting in a greater amount
of, and more detailed, information.
• Weight and space restrictions on airborne C2
systems will persist.
Joint Pub 6-0 states "..information should be
relevant, essential, timely and in a form that warriors can
quickly understand and can use to act. '
'
Because commanders in airborne command and control
platforms require a detailed understanding of a three
dimensional environment, they should adopt some type of 3D
display quickly. Perspective displays are not perfect for
absolutely every situation the commander will face; but the
added understanding of the action, tactics and intentions of
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This thesis will investigate new and improved C2
decision aids for airborne tactical and operational
commanders. The specific focus will be on the E-2C Hawkeye
.
A. DEFINITIONS
Since the term "decision aid' 1 is in the title, the
author will address the definitions of this term, and
others, immediately. Complete agreement on the use and
definition of these terms across many professions and
backgrounds is difficult to reach. The author selected the
most widely accepted definitions or those most applicable to
this thesis. "Decision aid'' refers to a system designed
to assist the decision maker by presenting information to
the user in a way to ease or speed his understanding. The
term Human Machine Interface (HMI) is a generic term for any
interface between a human and a machine, not limited to
displays. Some other forms of an HMI are a keyboard or
mouse. A display is a device that gives information in a
visual form, as on a cathode ray tube. (The American
Heritage Dictionary, 1982)
Before describing the problem we must distinguish
between data, information and understanding.
"Information is data collected from the environment
and processed into usable form. Combining pieces of
information with context produces ideas or provides
knowledge. By applying judgment, knowledge is transformed
into understanding. 1 ' (Joint Pub 6-0, 1995) See Figure 1.
Figure 1 Transition of Data to
understanding (Joint Pub 6-0,
1995)
The term "Situational Awareness" (SA) will be used a
fair amount in this paper and a simplified definition for SA
is one's level of understanding of the surrounding
environment
.
Situational awareness can be broken down into specific
tasks that must be done at any given time. A measure of SA
is whether or not the individual performs them and how well
he performs them. The list of tasks are (Shrestha et al,
1995) :
• maintain an accurate perception of the surrounding
environment (both internal and external to the unit
the individual is on)
• identify problems and/or potential problems
• recognize the need for action
• note deviations in the mission
• maintain awareness of tasks performed.
B . BACKGROUND
As a result of dramatic growth in the capabilities of
C4I systems, commanders have an immense amount of
information available to them. Increased bandwidths and
improved speeds in our communications systems can overload
our commanders with data. One solution is improved methods
of presenting information to the commander.
Among other things, a C2 system should present the
information in an easily assimilated form. Displays should
present the information in an intuitive style that eases the
commander's cognitive workload and speeds comprehension.
The author will discuss and focus on tasks or decision
aid capabilities that have not been addressed in planned
updates, or even visions, of the Hawkeye in 2005 or 2010.
Much of the focus in upgrades and follow-on aircraft is on a
more powerful computer system while too little attention is
paid to the interface between the computer and the user. In
fact, as speeds and volumes of information of data continue
to increase, the limiting factor of the Hawkeye as a C2
platform becomes not the human but the human machine
interface
.
Depictions in science fiction movies and novels of
humans with a receptacle in their head through which the
computer and the human communicate would be the ideal HMI
.
Our goal is to come as close to this ideal as possible. The
assumption in this case, is that along the input medium the
raw data is transformed to an ideal form that provides
instantaneous understanding for the human. All calculations
and conversions that do not require human judgment or
decisions are done by the computer. This greatly reduces
the cognitive load of translating and manipulating less
processed information and data. By doing this much, more of
his mental ability is available to maintain SA and make key
tactical and operational decisions. The focus of C2 system
designers should be on how to more efficiently instill
understanding not just to improve how to show data or
information
.
In that aim, the use of text should be limited where
possible. A picture says a thousand words is still true
today and recent studies in cognitive analysis shows
evidence for why this is true. The standard range and
bearing method of describing a track's position is an
attempt to paint a picture with text. As computers become
faster and more powerful, we can depict the scene
graphically, even in three dimensions, and instantly provide
the user a firm understanding of his environment. An
example of current efforts in this area is Force Threat
Evaluation and Weapons Assignment (FTEWA)
.
A greater reliance on the graphical representation may
allow the user to manipulate the picture, for example, use a
different viewpoint, take a vertical or horizontal slice,
rotate the world slowly and perhaps back and forth to glean
more detailed relative information. For the more rare case
requiring the highest accuracy and ample decision time,
text-based information can still be viewed. The key is that
the user has the option of using the more easily digestible
picture and resorting to text only when necessary. Omitting
the pictorial capability because it lacks exactness for
specific tasks robs the user of understanding in cases where
text is not necessary. This is because the picture is more
quickly and easily assimilated into situational awareness.
Current systems and those being designed are
incorporating more graphics than before. The step needed
now is to demote the text -based data and information to
supplementary screens and further improve pictorial
representations especially three dimensional displays for
use as the primary tool of the commander.
Some may argue that the bird's eye view screen used in
most DOD command centers and ships, shore and aircraft is
pictorial and sufficient. Bird's eye (2D) displays are
rudimentary and require a large amount of cognitive
resources to keep track of associated text-based information
(especially altitude) not displayed graphically to maintain
SA.
C. SCOPE
This thesis will investigate new and improved C2
decision aids for airborne tactical and operational
commanders. The specific focus will be on the E-2C Hawkeye
.
Chapter II will give background information on the E-2C and
its missions. In Chapter III, Tactical Decision Making
Under Stress (TADMUS) will be described and analyzed for its
potential contributions to a solution for the E-2C.
Monterey Technologies' New Millennium Electronic
Surveillance Interface System (NEMESIS) is a NAVAIR
supported effort to hypothesize about the future E-2C CIC.
This project will be described and analyzed in Chapter IV.
Chapter V will provide a background on three dimensional
displays and analyze applications to the E-2C CIC. As a
result of this discussion, conclusions and recommendations
(Chapter VI) will be made for program offices of the E-2C
and other airborne C2 platforms such as AWACS, ABCCC and
JSTARS . The discussion on 3D is included to support the
author's proposal to increase the use of three dimensional
displays in airborne command and control platforms.
This thesis will not include an experiment nor create
data. Results will not address nor will they likely be
directly applicable to cockpit displays. Reference may be
made to artificial intelligence or neural networks, but they
will not be discussed in detail in order to limit the
breadth of work. Because this thesis' intended audience is
operators of command and control platforms, and those that
acquire these systems, a focused discussion of the challenge
is presented. This audience is familiar with DOD missions
and systems and therefore a minimum of descriptions of these
terms will be used.
The results of this thesis should convince the
operators of C2 platforms that the three dimensional display
is the best choice now in the evolution towards the ideal
HMI .
D. ASSUMPTIONS
The following is a list of assumptions made:
• Available speed and bandwidth will continue to
increase and thus will enable more and more
information to be provided to commanders.
• Sensor sophistication and capabilities will
continue to improve resulting in a greater amount
of, and more detailed, information.
• Weight and space restrictions on airborne C2
systems will persist.
II. E-2C HAWKEYE BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. CURRENT DISPLAYS IN THE CIC OF THE HAWKEYE
Why does the crew in the E-2C need an improved HMI?
What is it about the job they do and the tasks they complete
in a normal mission that require improved displays? The
Combat Information Center Officer (CICO) and his crew as a
team in a tactical or operational command and control
platform must make decisions within severe time restrictions
and while being bombarded with information and requests from
numerous sources. The current displays used in the CIC of
the E-2C are antiquated and do not support naturalistic
decision making. Some readers that are not familiar with
the E-2C mission may suggest that applications such as
Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Common
Operating Picture (COP) or Common Operating Environment
(COE) could be adapted for use in the E-2C CIC. These
applications or standards are sufficient at higher levels of
command but wholly unsuited for the operators in the E-2C
Hawkeye. GCCS and the COP lack the level of detail and
responsiveness required.
B. E-2C HAWKEYE DESCRIPTION
A brief description of the E-2C Hawkeye follows. If
further details are desired, references such as Jane's or
the E-2C NATOPS manual would be a good start for a more
detailed description.
An E-2C could be described simply as a miniature AWACS
that flies from an aircraft carrier. This description is
not completely accurate, but provides a general




Combat Weight 48,000 lb.
Wing Span 80' 7"
Length 57' 6 3/4"
Rotodome Diameter...24'
Two Turbo Prop Engines
About 4-5 hr. On-Station Time
Max Speed 300 KIAS
Figure 2 Aircraft Data
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A broad brush description of systems on board is a
necessary prelude to discussing capabilities and missions.
The B-band radar uses a rotating antenna depicted in
Figure 3 and provides a range of about 300 miles for 360
degree coverage of the air and surface. Also incorporated
in the dome with the radar antenna is the IFF antenna.
D. Best Photo
Figure 3 Grumman E-2C Hawkeye
The communications gear includes six UHF capable
radios, three of which are also VHF and Havequick capable.
Two of these six are also Link-11 and UHF relay capable.
One is Link-4 capable and three are secure voice capable.
The aircraft is also equipped with two HF radios which can
support plain and secure voice and Link-11. A recent
addition to the communications suite is a SATCOM radio.
Some E-2Cs in various steps of upgrades may have additional
11
capabilities like Link- 16 and Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC)
.
Another system on board is the Passive Detection System
(PDS) . This system is operator intensive but covers a large
range of frequencies. Proposed systems for future version
of the E-2C or Airborne Early warning (AEW) version of the
Common Support Aircraft (CSA) are Tactical Receive Equipment
(TRE) and an Infra-Red Sensing system (IRST)
.
C. E-2C MISSIONS
The missions performed are carried out primarily by the
three operators in the small CIC. (Figure 4) These mission
include Command and Control (C2) , Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
,
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) , Strike Warfare (STW) which may
include Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAD, Airborne Command
Control and Communication (ABCCC) , Close Air Support (CAS)
Electronic Support (ES) , Surface Warfare (SUW) , Airborne
Command Element (ACE) , Undersea Warfare (USW) , Search and
Rescue (SAR) , Counter Drug (CD) and Hummer Controlled
Approach (HCA) - a method to use the E-2's radar to get
aircraft aboard the carrier in the event of catastrophic
damage to the ship's radar systems.
12
Figure 4 E-2C CIC
The crew normally performs many of these missions
simultaneously during a single flight. They may also have
to rapidly change missions in reaction to events affecting
the task force. Additional missions are added to their load
when another C2 is unable to perform their assigned mission.
The crew is very busy and it is obvious that they need
13
decision aids. As an E-2C commander, the author knows first
hand how important a 3D display would be.
D . COMMUNICATIONS
A description of a representative flight from a carrier
follows. The terms Radar Operator (RO) , Air Control Officer
(ACO) and CICO usually refer to the seat or scope position
in the CIC, but do not always imply the job done by the
person sitting at that station. The CICO, as the mission
commander, runs the CIC. He must supervise newer Naval
Flight Officers (NFOs) who are controlling multiple aircraft
searching for and identifying surface contacts. The CICO
must also request and provide information to the ACO who is
controlling four F-18s on Combat Air Patrol (CAP) or running
intercepts. Communication amongst the three team members in
the CIC is done over the Internal Communications System
(ICS) . Other methods of communicating among the three are
the use of functions and symbols on their screens, gestures,
and even poking/grabbing in extreme cases. The pilot and
copilot also communicate to the CICO and CIC via the ICS.
They might request updates on stationing and ownship
traffic, as well as inform the CICO of any factors that
could affect the mission or time on station. This is not an
all-inclusive list of ICS communications but gives a
representative case of communications within the airplane.
14
Interaction with platforms outside of the aircraft by
the CICO include monitoring information sent out on data
links such as Link 4, Link 11, and/or Link 16. Because this
information is generated and sent mostly automatically, via
the computer and software, any problem like a dropped track
on Link 11 or a fighter symbol drifting away from the actual
track it represents must be fixed quickly with operator
inputs. The CICO would also be talking with the air warfare
commander of the task group usually referred to as AW on a
dedicated AW net. The CICO is also coordinating with other
Airborne C2 platforms from not only the US but NATO and
other countries
.
When overloaded, the CICO often asks the copilot to
monitor a net for him. The copilot acts as a human filter
and relays only pertinent information via ICS to the CICO.
The CICO may sporadically or as required listen to the AIC
as a way of updating himself on how they are progressing and
to coordinate critical radar coverage with the pilot or
copilot. The SATCOM radio allows direct links with higher
echelons of command which often increases requests and
demands for information and explanation. The CICO monitors





To highlight the tasks performed by the CICO the same
example flight from the previous section will be used. This
time the example is presented chronologically. Immediately
upon entering the aircraft the CICO begins assessing the
status of the aircraft and systems by gathering information
from the Radar Operator, Air Control Officer, and his
displays. The CICO also exchanges information with the
pilots providing them essential information on the status of
specific systems, while getting updates from them on the
aircraft and flight deck. Passdown information on current
situations is also received from other airborne C2 platforms
including another E-2 coming off station. This information
is used to update or change information briefed prior to
manning up.
System setup is done all the while. Radios are tuned
to pre-briefed frequencies, the radar options are selected,
and personal scope preferences entered. Specific
information pertinent to the current mission (such as
geographic references, aircraft identities, and data link
setup) is also entered and displayed. As launch approaches,
the CICO focuses more on the aircraft and the pilot's
incoming information. Most of the radio communications just
prior to launch will be incoming and significant changes are
noted. Before launching, a final "go 11 system status is
16
required, and choices must be made in seconds that could
result in cancellation of the flight.
Immediately after the wheels leave the deck the CICO
begins talking to the ship and pilots. Climbing up to
station the CICO assists the pilots with traffic avoidance.
As the sensor picture comes to life and tracks fill the
scope, all operators begin sorting out who is who by fusing
information from the sensors, radios, datalinks, each other,
and information from the preflight brief. With a firm grasp
on the tactical and operational picture for 300 miles in all
directions from his airplane, the CICO begins to coordinate
his mission with other commanders in the area. These could
include commanders of air, surface, sub- surface and
electronic warfare. As a player in these missions the CICO
must divide his attention amongst distinctly different
missions. The CICO provides assistance to his controllers
by fixing or adding information on their scopes. He and his
controllers must be in synch for their highly efficient
smart push, user pull information exchange to be effective.
Along with his primary duties, he must help the RO and ACO.
All three operators are continuously noting and
reporting new and unknown contacts and immediately taking
action to help identify them. The CICO must also commit
part of his attention to looking at the tracks as they
relate to his own aircraft . In addition to looking at
tracks and how they might affect the CAP and SSC aircraft
17
controlled by his operators, he must also consider these
tracks and any other's impact on the carrier, or other ships
of the task force
.
F. A SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE OF CURRENT SYSTEM SHORTCOMINGS
The main displays in the E-2C's CIC present a bird's
eye view, 2D perspective. A major drawback of this type of
display is a lack of visual altitude cues. Because only two
dimensions are used, the third dimension (altitude) is
relegated to alpha-numerics and usually displayed in another
region or screen when a track is selected. To demonstrate
how this shortcoming adversely affects the human operator
let us consider the radically simplified case of three
tracks converging at one spot on the bird's eye view screen.
The CICO can see this immediately without having to check
text based course and speed readouts because of the speed
leaders on each track. At a glance he can see from the
direction the leaders are pointed that they are all headed
toward the same point in the two dimensional world depicted
on his screen. He can also tell from the size of the speed
leaders roughly, how fast each are going and conclude that
all will reach the same point at the approximately the same
time. This is an example of using graphics to more
efficiently convey information to the human. This same idea
can be applied in still more ways with similar favorable
results. We can know at a glance their motion relative to
18
each other (in 2 dimensions) . Standard Naval Tactical Data
System (NTDS) symbology tells us that one is friendly, one
unknown and one hostile. Is the friendly aircraft going to
run into the unknown aircraft? In order to decide, the
operator must determine the altitude of each. To get this
third dimensional information he hooks the friendly
aircraft, reads the alphanumeric readout and stores this
string of numbers in short term memory. Next he hooks and
reads the altitude of the unknown aircraft, and compares
this with that of the altitude of the friendly aircraft.
While doing this, what did the hostile aircraft do? Did an
important call on a radio distract him? Has the hostile
aircraft maneuvered to a threatening position on the
friendly or unknown aircraft?
To complicate the scenario slightly, consider the
possibility of the hostile aircraft performing an air to
surface missile launch tactic against a nearby ship in the
task force? What was his flight pattern, and altitude? The
displays used in the E-2 CIC are not designed to display
this information in an easily assimilated way.
Specifically, the third dimension which is so essential to
understand this situation is represented with text on a
separate screen. It would be extremely difficult without
any distractions at all, no less all the CICO is confronted
with, to construct a mental image of the flight path in
three dimensions. Any number of three dimensional
19
techniques could do this extremely demanding task for the
operator and provide him with the end result for his use at
a glance. Freeing the CICO of this mentally taxing task
allows him to focus more of his efforts on tactics and
strategy which require human judgment. A simple analogy is
trying to do long division in your head instead of on a
calculator.
G. EXACT HARDWARE DETAILS
In the actions portion of this chapter the author
purposefully limited references to specific keystrokes, or
buttons, pushed by the commander at his station. The reason
for this is to avoid addressing current limitations in
hardware and software that either have or will be fixed in
updated versions of the Hawkeye . The ideas proposed in this
paper transcend the buttons and keys.
The decision aid in the E-2 CIC should be rethought
from the ground up to minimize the cognitive load of the
commander and maximize the transfer of information through
the HCI . Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) principles and
three dimensional depictions are two tools that could enable
this. These tools speed the commander's decision cycle or
OODA Loop (see Figure 5) and free his mental capacity for
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This chapter will briefly discuss the background and
theory of TADMUS. Then, TADMUS DSS-2 modules are presented
along with the benefits each provides to the commander.
Finally, these modules are presented from the perspective of
benefits they would provide to an E-2C Hawkeye crew.
A. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
The TADMUS project was born from a recent problem and a
newly recognized possible solution. The recent problem was
a pair of mishaps by the US Navy involving decisions that
produced horribly wrong outcomes. First, the USS Stark did
not engage an aircraft that eventually shot an Exocet
missile at it. The Commanding Officer and the crew in CIC
did not believe the aircraft was a threat. Second, the USS
Vincennes engaged what it thought was a hostile inbound
aircraft when in fact the aircraft was an Iranian Airbus.
The hope was to develop a decision support system that would
prevent similar incidents in the future.
Researchers, analyzing the decision making processes
from these incidents, recognized a deficiency in the systems
designed to aid the operators in the CIC. These systems
were designed with an outdated view of the human cognitive
process. "Traditional ' ' decision theory suggests that the
commander gathered as much data as possible, developed
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hypotheses or options, and selects the optimal solution
based on situational key performance parameters. This form
of decision making is extremely time intensive and requires
protracted calculations by the decision maker.
New research in decision making has produced a new
hypothesis on how commanders decide on a course of action.
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) shows that experienced
decision makers use a different technique to provide
solutions to problems that are time limited and entail some
uncertainty. According to NDM, a person with considerable
experience in a dynamic environment quickly assesses the
situation, classifies it, and provides a solution based on
his memory of previous similar situations, applied solutions
and outcomes.
This new view of decision making and the recent tragic
events with the Stark and Vincennes led researchers to
design a new decision aid for the commander. The product of
the TADMUS program is a decision support system (DSS) that
supported the commander's (newly understood) naturalistic
decision making process.
Two specific tenets of NDM used to develop DSS-2 are
(1) feature matching and (2) story generation. (1)
"Feature matching involves an organization of memory, or
v
schemas, ' and information processing where decision makers
use their previous experiences to asses a situation and
identify promising actions .'' (Noble , 1989) (2) Story
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generation is "employed when the body of evidence relevant
to a decision is large, complex, and the implications of its
components are interdependent .' ' (Hutchins, 1996)
Naturalistic decision making principles of feature
matching and story generation are incorporated into DSS in
many ways. A key component of NDM and especially feature
matching is the commander's situational awareness (SA)
.
Though SA is not a new term to the military commander,
decision support systems specifically designed to markedly
improve SA through a better understanding of his decision
process are. Current and previous systems tried to convey
the ""picture' 1 to the operator; while feature matching
provided the awareness of the absolute best depiction of the
situation. The ""picture'' depiction was critically
important because it contained the features the commander
would try to match to memory of a similar scenario to
produce a decision. Previously, traditional decision making
designers thought providing the most information to feed all
the theories and courses of action was paramount.
With the new revelations of NDM, the importance shifted
to quickly instilling situation awareness so the commander
could match it to a previous experience. Exact details were
still provided and available, but the importance shifted
from providing information to instilling SA quickly and
accurately.
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The researchers in the TADMUS program recognized the
advantages of graphical presentation over text to speed and
ease understanding. For a majority of uses, graphics
"reduce the amount of mental computation required to
perform tasks and allow users to spend less time searching
for needed information. ' (Larkin and Simon, 1987)
A specific example of the DSS taking advantage of
graphics is the track history module of the DSS which uses
templates of weapons envelopes of the ship as well as
templates of potential weapons of threat tracks (Hutchins,
1996) (see Figure 6) . With these templates the commander
can instantly asses his own weapons against the potential
hostile 's. Without this module the commander would have to
perform timely and mentally demanding information hunts,
comparisons and calculations, while he is also busy doing
other activities.
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Figure 6 Track Profile
(Morrison et al, in press)
module of DSS -2
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B. DESCRIPTION OF TADMUS DSS VERSION 2.0 (DSS-2)
The TADMUS DSS-2 ' s design is based on the results and
feedback from DSS version 1 (DSS-1) and lessons learned from
operating DSS-1. New considerations for DSS-2 were to fully
integrate the geo-plot, use DSS-2 as both a primary and
supplementary display vice strictly a supplementary display,
touch-screen, rapid scaling, declutter tools and other
technical considerations.
Cognitive task analysis provided the designers with a
detailed understanding of a tactical commander's workload.
The DSS was then designed to aid this specific workload.
"The prototype DSS was developed with the objectives of:
(1) minimizing the mismatches between cognitive processes
and the data available in the CIC to facilitate decision
making; (2) mitigating the shortcomings of current CIC
displays in imposing high information processing demands and
exceeding the limitations of human memory; and (3)
transferring the data in the current CIC from numeric to
graphical representations wherever appropriate .' ' (Morrison
et al, in press)
Figure 7 is a representation of DSS-2. Next, the
author will describe each of the components.
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Figure 7 DSS-2 (Morrison et al, in press)
1. Geo-Plot
Figure 8 Geo-plot (Morrison et al, in press)
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DSS-2 incorporates a geo-plot (Figure 8) which results
in a smooth interface both visually and functionally. This
geo-plot is similar to the current (2D) bird's eye-view used
in most CIC environments. Functions which involve both a
module and the geo-plot are seamless and intuitive. Also,
significant new features are:
• the use of variable coded NTDS symbology
• improved overlays
• improved scaling and declutter
• weapon envelopes that can be shown on units
• the ability to toggle the screen between symbols and
track numbers (referred to as the track number
toggle)
• the option of seeing the geo-plot in three dimensions
(really 2V2D - more on this in Chapter V) .









Figure 9 CRO and Multi-CRO Access Panel (Morrison et al,
in press)
Along the bottom of the DSS-2 are summaries or CROs
(Figure 9) of the highest priority tracks from left to
right. The priority is determined by an amenable algorithm.
Three significant aspects of this part of the system are:
(1) As the priority of tracks change, the CROs move within
the multi-CRO panel. This feature provides another cue for
the user that a change in the situation might require his
attention and or action; (2) The arrow gives an immediate
indication of the direction of the track (inbound, outbound,
ascending, descending); (3) Selecting a track in the geo-
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Figure 10 Track Profile (Morrison et al, in press)
The track profile module (Figure 10) allows the user to
see at a glance, where the selected track is relative to the
ship in range and altitude in the main screen and range and
azimuth in the mini-screen inset in the upper right corner.
Additionally, history dots or trailers are displayed to aid
understanding of the track's flight profile and possible
related weapons, actions or intentions. This panel allows
the commander to evaluate the threat's potential weapon
envelopes against his own ship. This threat can also be
shown relative to another friendly unit and that unit's
associated weapon envelopes. This feature aids
deconf liction and coordination and thus improves the
effectiveness of the battlegroup as a whole. This feature
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is obviously well suited for use by warfare coordinators and
battle group commanders or any other higher level commander.
4 . Response Manager
I













Engage / Do not Engage decision
Figure 11 Response Manager (Morrison et al, in press)
The response manager (Figure 11) depicts necessary or
recommended actions and responses relative to the selected
track's range from own ship. This allows the commander to
understand what responses he should be considering or doing
and should have done as the tracks range (depicted by the
white vertical line) changes. The responses and actions
displayed reflect current doctrine, battle orders and/or
ROE. The track's range is shown with a vertical line
against a range scale across the top of the module.
Responses are displayed below the ranges that they should be
initiated and completed. The actions taken are a different
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color than those not yet taken. This module aids the
commander in keeping track of what he has done, while cueing
him as to what possible or recommended actions he should
take
.
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IFF No IFF Response
Inside 35 nm ROE limit Age 0:3:30
Figure 12 Track Summary (Morrison et al, in
press)
The track summary module (Figure 12) provides detailed
information about the selected track. It will incorporate
amplifying data from various sources and summarize it all in
one display window along with the standard parametric data
(bearing, range, altitude, course and speed)
.
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6. Basis For Assessment
Basis for Evidence in Support
Assessment ES- Platform ID (Threat)
No IFF response
Origin near air base
Closing in ranqe
Necs Assumptions
Conduct! rig targeti ng
Carryi ng weapon






Figure 13 Basis for Assessment (Morrison et al, in press)
This module is more text intensive thus requiring more
time to assimilate the information, but must be included and
used whenever possible. The basis for assessment module
(Figure 13) allows the commander to review the reasoning
behind his assessments and classifications of tracks. The
user can evaluate (1) evidence supporting his assessment;
(2) evidence contradicting his assessment; (3) evidence
supporting a different assessment; and (4) evidence
contradicting that assessment. The module also lists the
necessary assumptions needed for each assessment. This list
helps the commander be aware of, understand and remember the
necessary assumptions behind his assessment. This list of
assumptions can also cue the decision maker to acquire
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information that might help him reduce or resolve any
ambiguity or uncertainty and build confidence.
C. TEST RESULTS
Each of the modules in the DSS-2 was designed to
specifically support the actual decision processes used by
commanders. (1) Story generation is directly supported by
the "basis for assessment '' , ""track summary 1 ', and "track
profile modules ' ' . (2) Feature matching or [Recognition-
Primed Decision (RPD) ] making is supported by the "geo-
plot ' , ""response manager' 1 and ""track profile 1 '. Other
factors considered in the design of the modules are:
• bias errors (basis for assessment)
• short term memory (basis for assessment, geo-plot,
response manager and track profile)
.
Also, the track summary module supports short term
memory by enabling the system to maximize graphic, efficient
displays; while keeping fused and concise information
accessible for detailed analysis.
In all the modules of DSS-2 there is an effort to
reduce the amount of raw data displayed. Well -processed and
presented information is used to reduce the amount of
cognitive workload placed on the commander.
A detailed description of the results of tests with
DSS-2 are included in (Morrison et al, in press) . A summary
of their results follows.
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The DSS was tested using AEGIS CIC experienced TAOs
and COs. The testers found that with DSS, critical contacts
were reported as tracks of interest much more often than
without DSS. With DSS, teams were more likely to take
defensive action against imminent threats. Another benefit
of DSS was a reduced verbal communication flow. Individuals
had more information readily available to them and did not
need to verbally acquire information as much with DSS.
Additionally, there were less requests for clarification
information concerning track kinematics, emitter information
and the tactical picture.
D. DSS APPLICATION TO E-2C CIC
In general, the TADMUS DSS was designed in response to
the specific problem of AAW aboard AEGIS ships. That limits
the usefulness of DSS-2. However, the principles of NDM,
specifically "story generation' 1 and "situation
assessment would greatly benefit display designs for most
command and control applications.
Specifically each panel in DSS-2, Figure 7, would
provide the following advantages to the E-2C crew:
1. Geo-plot
The geo-plot is similar to the current E-2C CIC display
and features. The track number toggle is an ingenious and
valuable capability. The three dimensional feature could
prove much more useful for the Hawkeye crew. Because so
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much of their focus is in the air, the ability to see that
environment in 3D has the potential to ease memory and
processing demands while aiding RPD . In the E-2C CIC,
altitude information is more essential and assessed more
often than on a ship. Incorporating the alphanumerics of
altitude into another dimension in the picture can produce
significant improvements in the commanders SA.
2. Multi-CRO Access Panel
The multi-CRO access panel would be equally valuable to
the E-2 commander for the same reasons as the ship
commander. The priority algorithm may prove more difficult
to implement because of the different missions performed. A
simple fix for this problem would be an individual,
operator-selectable algorithm based on the mission he is
performing or personal preference.
3 . Track Profile
Track profile would be useful for the E-2 to evaluate
threats as they relate to various surface units and could be
applied with some success to air to air engagements. A
limitation of the track profile panel that could be
addressed with some kind of 3D view is the ability to assess
more than one track's profile simultaneously. The author
can imagine the commander repeatedly viewing the profiles of
a number of seemingly related tracks one at a time to try to
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determine if they are acting in concert (demands extremely
high cognitive workload)
.
4 . Response Manager
The E-2C commander may have less use for the response
manager. It might be somewhat more useful if it could
display ROE or tactics for different missions on demand.
Implementing this might be difficult because of the
multitude of missions performed and the fact that the E-2C
often must consider threats as they relate to other units as
well as itself.
5 . Track Summary
The track summary window is similar to a supplementary
screen currently in the E-2. This module assumes an
improvement in data fusion from a wide range of sources and
various levels of classification. The data fusion problem
is being addressed and the potential classification problem
is minimized in the Hawkeye by a universally cleared crew
and restricted access to those that were in the plan when it
took off.
6. Basis for Assessment
The basis for assessment window is an excellent
application that may prove useful for the E-2 crew depending
on crew loading and mission intensity. One hope for more
use of this module during high workload flights would be
that the time savings realized from the other benefits of
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the DSS-2 could be spent using this module. The reality is
that most likely other more important tasks will use that
time. During a busy flight, a best case scenario involves






NEMESIS (New Millennium Electronic Surveillance
Interface System) is the product of Monterey Technologies'
(MT) work for a future E-2C CIC HMI . They were contracted
to perform a complete review of all operator tasks and
loading in the CIC. Then design an HMI for the E-2C from
scratch. The focus was to apply the latest technology and
principles in decision aiding to make the most effective HMI
for the operators, not to improve the current displays.
MT created a top down task analysis, bottom up task
performance description and an analysis of task loading.
They relied heavily on input and recommendations from
experienced E-2C NFOs throughout the analysis, design,
testing and reviews. They incorporated lessons and
recommendations from a prototype model.
Monterey Technologies' goal was to produce an "HMI
that allows NFOs to focus their energy and attention on
situation evaluation and decision making, rather than on
tasks required to simply operate the system.'' (Sharkey et
al, 1997)
Unfortunately, one significant limitation of the
NEMESIS design was not fully incorporating communications
(voice, data and imagery) . The requirement was not in the
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contract and would have required considerable additional
resources and time to accomplish. MT acknowledged this
limitation and included many recommendations in that area.
However, by not including full communications in the
analysis, the interface may result in less than optimum
performance of the system and its operators.
The designers of NEMESIS make a critical distinction
between most HMIs in use in today's military and HMIs for
use with tactical systems; many military and commercial
standards for HMI development do not apply to tactical
systems. "Tactical systems are real-time systems in which
some mixture of computer automation and human decision
making must: (1) maintain an awareness (SA) of the evolving
situation, (2) continuously process multiple threads of
diverse information, (3) respond to selected events rapidly
and accurately, (4) to meet mission objectives, (5) while
minimizing risk to human life and combat materiel.' 1
(Sharkey et al, August 1997)
B. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
The following condensed description of NEMESIS is based
on the design guides found in the final report. (Sharkey et
al, August 1997)













Figure 14 NEMESIS Display Surface (Sharkey et al, 1997)
"Key features of NEMESIS include (Sharkey et al, August
1997) :
• A large (34 in wide by 24 in tall; 816 sq. in.),
flat panel display
• A display area dedicated to PDS contacts
• A display area dedicated to contacts of interest
outside the current map display
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• A touch screen capability allowing use of a finger
or stylus in lieu of lightpen
• Support for multiple, redundant cursor control
devices (joystick, trackball, mouse)
• Plan and 2^-D map displays
• An advanced hooking algorithm
• A Multiple Track Index (MTI) allowing NFOs access to
all raw and fused track data
• Natural language voice recognition & synthesis
• A system voice-reply capability
• Automated monitoring and alerting. 1 '
The following sections describe the details of NEMESIS.
1. Variable Action Buttons (VABs) & Fixed Action
Buttons (FABs)
Unlike many non-tactical HMIs pull down menus would be
too time intensive to use repeatedly. For those actions
performed often and in time-compressed situations experience
shows FABs and VABs have proven most efficient.
FABs represent operations required in almost all
scenarios. These buttons would not change and would be
accessible at all times. The VABs are a set of buttons that
allow the user to make a breadth and depth of selections.
















































Figure 15 Example of Commands Accessed by VABs (Sharkey et
al, 1997)
Figure 16 is an example VAB layout that changes map
orientation. Selecting the Map Orientation VAB the user
would then see the VABs change to North, South East or West.
The other spaces would be blank. Selecting the VAB for
South would then change the orientation of his map display.
VABs and FABs must be iteratively designed with the users to
be most effective.
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Figure 16 VAB Layout (Sharkey et al, 1997)
2 . Map Display Window
The map display is the primary focus of the commander.
This picture gives him the majority of his situational
awareness. Functions and other windows are used to fill in
information or resolve questions.
Dr. Glenn Osga ' s (Osga G. and Keating, R. , 1994)
research has provided information on optimum gray coloring
of land and sea. NEMESIS utilizes his findings as the
default, but allows qualified users to choose other
colorings. NEMESIS uses contrasting pixels to represent the
shoreline with the land appearing raised relative to the
sea.
Prelook is a function that provides a melding of the
information in the MTI with those on the map window. This
function will display a select number of pertinent fields
from the MTI whenever a track is selected for prelook.
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The Association Read Out is a dramatic improvement of a
current capability of the E-2C. This read out (Figure 17)
displays intercept information specific to designated
intercepting tracks (usually aircraft intercepting another
unit including tanking)
.









Figure 17 ARO w/ Intercept Page (Sharkey et al, 1997)
A declutter feature is included for congested areas of
the screen. Current displays in the E-2C CIC only allow the
user to select a smaller scale to better see a cluttered
group. The major drawback of the current method is that
when you change the scale of the display you lose the larger
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picture. (The windows style of child windows is an obvious
and easy COTS solution.) The zoomed window also includes an
abbreviated version of the MTI for those tracks in the
declutter window.
3 . Multiple Track Index
Figure 18 is a generic example of the standard MTI .
Like TADMUS, NEMESIS fully integrates the MTI with the map.
Selections and functions done in one window are reflected in
the other and vice versa. It is immediately obvious that
the MTI contains more information than the DSS multi-CRO
display. Whether this is better is debatable.
The CRO's allow a quicker summary of information
without overloading the user with text. The altitude arrow
represents a key piece of knowledge not readily attained
from the MTI. The priority algorithm of the multi-CRO
display would help alert the user of changes in status and
reduce his cognitive load.
However, the MTI is specifically designed for the E-2
and the CRO was designed to function for an AEGIS in AAW
mode. The multitude of missions and scenarios the E-2 is
involved in would make the processed knowledge displayed in
the CROs and priority algorithms difficult to implement if
not impossible. The next best thing to do, which NEMESIS
does, is to present the information in a familiar form
(spreadsheet) and allow rapid processing via sorts and other
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functions. The MTI will be more time intensive and require
more cognitive effort, but software to handle CROs for the
E-2 would represent a step beyond today's technology.
One item the author noticed that might be difficult to
implement is the possibility for a field in the MTI to be
any length. In the interest of simplicity, brevity and
uniformity the author's opinion would be to limit the
fields. The value of knowledge gained from scrolling or
looking at lengthy fields will most likely not out weigh the
value of other tasks missed or delayed. This is a
compromise between the CRO and lengthy spreadsheet fields.
Smbl Type ID Pltfm ID GeoPoints Hdg Spd Alt Brg Rng C/S
Surface FRN Carrier 36 35N 124 15W 180 12 0.0 Eagle
O Surface FRN FFG 36 30N 124 10W 180 12 0.0 G1L
O Surface FRN DDG 36 30N 124 20W 180 12 0.0 5FI
Surface FRN DDG 36 40N 124 10W 180 12 0.0 S4R
Air FRN KC-10 36 00N 123 00W ORBIT 280 27.0 Texaco 21
o Surface FRN FFG 36 40N 124 20W 180 12 0.0 63P
Air FRN E-2C 37 28N 123 50W ORBIT 190 25.0
Air FRN EC-135 37 1 ON 124 20W ORBIT Baron 52
Air FRN E-8C 36 12N 123 40W ORBIT Bishop 56
Surface FRN LHD 36 33N 123 09W 020 12 0.0 7BE
Surface FRN LPD 36 31N 123 11W 020 12 0.0 U2Q
9 (Air) FRN RDVZPoint 36 15N 123 00W
Surface HOS PTBoat 36 47N 121 58W 270 50 0.0
Surface HOS SS (Sub) 36 55N 122 29W 250 8 0.0
M (Surface) HOS CapitalArfld 36 56N 121 47W
O Surface FRN LPD 36 35N 123 11W 020 12 0.0 Y8H
Figure 18 Standard MTI (Sharkey et al # 1997)
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Figure 18 is not an efficient organization of the MTI
.
The type and ID columns would be handy for sorting, but they
are redundant and inefficient for quick use. The two
columns are combined more efficiently in the symbol column.
This redundancy is not of great concern since mission or
personal sorts would probably move them anyway. For
example, the author would move the Type, GeoPoints and ID
columns out to the right. GeoPoints would not likely be
needed since future data links will make almost all tracks
available to the other units in the force. Now the headings
start to resemble the entries found in a CRO. The author
would sort them left to right, symbol, C/S (callsign)
,
heading, speed, altitude and platform ID. The pertinent
information would be readily available while less used
information would continue out to the right.
The author would also rather extend the width of the
window than scroll sideways in the window. This would
reduce the need for the complicated function of freezing
columns. Freezing a column keeps it visible while others
slide out of the window as the user scrolls to the left or
right
.
Another helpful feature of the MTI is the fused column.
This is a way of showing sensors (radar, IFF, passive,
Electro-optical, satellite, visual) and units that are
reporting information on a track. The column provides a
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concise report of what sensors onboard the E-2 and other
units that are reporting information. If the user needs
amplifying information, he can select the more detailed
descriptions of platforms and sensors reported (Figure 19)
.
This may allow him to perform conflict resolution or
consider alternatives.
Source ID % Mod<2Alt FrecjSpd Active Passive IFF Visual ID
E-2C MIG-21 85 2 34.3 lat/long/alt/speed PRF/freq
JSTARS SU-27 87 464 lat/long/alt/speed XXX
EA-6B MIG-21 93 341 lat/long/alt/speed PRF/freq @ time coc
Figure 19 Detailed Fused Data Report (Sharkey et al, 1997)
Figure 20 represents the MTI in an unsorted state.
The solution to the multi-mission status of the E-2 is
addressed in the MTI by mission select buttons that allow
the user to sort the fields in a way optimized for specific
missions (PDS, AEW, HCA) or by personal preference. The
following figures depict a mission sort selection.
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J^^|moMsaveJ| M
symbol Type ID Platform ID GeoPoints FRQ Activity Heading Speed PRF
s Air FRN AC- 130 33 55N 118 25W Gunship 360 160
s Air FRN AC-130 33 55N 118 25W Gunship 360 160
& Air FRN C-130 33 55N 118 25W Rescue 360 160
& Air FRN P-3C 38 00N 125 00W Patrol 180 240
^ Air FRN KC-135 38 00N 124 30W Tank 180 320
£ Air FRN EC-135 38 00N 124 00W EW 180 360
1 Air FRN E-8C 38 00N 123 50W EW 180 350
m Air FRN KC-10 33 55N 118 25W Tank 300 340
Figure 2 Unsorted MTI (Sharkey et al, 1997)
Figure 21 represents the MTI after selecting a mission
sort for AEW. The rows remain the same while the columns
are moved to facilitate the AEW mission. This ability to
tailor the MTI makes the enormous amount of information
manageable and thus more useful to the user.
symb GeoPoints C/S Platform ID Hdg Speed Alt DLTN Rng Brg Bingo
& 33 55N 118 25W Falcon 01 AC-130 360 3021
B 33 55N 118 25W Falcon 02 AC-130 360 3421
m 33 55N 118 25W Sparrow 101 C-130 360 3542
^ 38 00N 125 00W P-3C 180 3642
^ 38 00N 124 30W KC-135 180 3045
?s 38 00N 124 00W Baron 52 EC-135 180 3043
ra 38 00N 123 50W Bishop 56 E-8C 180 3022
m 33 55N 118 25W Texaco 21 KC-10 300 3125
Figure 21 MTI Sorted for AEW (Sharkey et al, 1997)
The inclusion of callsigns in the MTI is an obvious
improvement. This inclusion assumes and implies the ability
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to automatically incorporate Air Tasking Orders (ATO) , Air
Control Orders (ACO) and other such information. Today, the
ability to gather and process information from these orders
is all done manually and requires significant preflight
planning and cognitive effort before and during the flight.
Previously, the only link between the IFF and track
number and the ATO callsign has been a manually entered
label for the callsign on the display when time permits. By
including this information in the MTI data the user's burden
when referencing callsigns is dramatically reduced.
4 . Look For Window
A search feature not currently available but required
is the ability to search all contacts for those meeting
specific requirements. This is essentially a query
performed on the MTI that could be done via a window or
verbally. An example "Look for 1 ' window depicting a search
for hostile air tracks within 100 miles of the carrier is

















Figure 22 "Look for" Window with Hostile Air Within 100
Miles of Carrier Entered (Sharkey et al, 1997)
"The following are examples of information that the
Look For' algorithm can find (Sharkey et al, August 1997)
:
• Contacts that disappear (e.g., they are shot down, or
have landed)
• Contacts not visible; but still exist in system
• A contact in the system, but off the display,
viewable at a larger scale.
• A contact in the system, but not found by the NFO
(possibly due to the symbol being minimized)
.
•Other example searches are:
•Find track number 1234
•Find GP-162 (specific C/S)
•Find Texaco (pilot's call sign)
•Find Fighters, Interceptors (A/C types)
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•Find "Low on Fuel' (A/C within certain status
categories) . '
'
5 . Voice Control Window
Voice control of the system in the E-2C CIC is proposed
for NEMESIS. One of the major causes of errors in the CIC
is a large queue of tasks that builds up as the operator
struggles to prioritize and then perform the most important
tasks. NEMESIS helps to reduce this queue by accepting
voice commands. Initial analysis shows that less of the
operator's time will be spent manipulating the system and
more time can be devoted to tactics and operational
decisions
.
With the current system the operator must dedicate
cognitive effort to constantly prioritizing and re-
prioritizing waiting tasks while he completes them as fast
as his hands can move. Voice activation allows him to
perform tasks simultaneously and thus reduce the amount of
waiting tasks. This shortened list of queued tasks requires
less prioritizing and thus less cognitive effort . The
effects are synergistic. Less cognitive load required for
prioritizing a queue allows him to perform the tasks faster
and better.
The author sees great potential for this feature but
would like to consider some difficulties in implementation.
The first is ambient noise in the aircraft which affects the
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clarity of inputs. Noise cancellation and filters can solve
this until ambient noise is reduced in the current air frame
or in the follow-on aircraft currently designated the Common
Support Aircraft (CSA)
.
The second difficulty, as noted by the designers, is
the slow advance of natural language (continuous voice
recognition) technology. If this proves to be problematic,
hot (discrete) word systems could be used as a fallback.
Both of these methods concern the author because of the
increased amount of communication required by the operators
within the aircraft; while communications with sources
outside the aircraft remain constant. Verbal commands to
NEMESIS must compete with normal voice communications
already required to perform the E-2C mission. Commands to
the computer would potentially interfere with the other
NFOs ' understanding of the voice communications.
NEMESIS addresses some of the auditory traffic
problems by proposing cues, and alternate outputs for
messages in the queue such as text on the screen. The
effect of a backed up queue and difficult algorithms or
procedures to ensure proper priorities are assigned concerns
the author
.
6. 2VSD Tactical Aid Window
MT took a big step with NEMESIS, by providing a 2^D or
perspective view as an option. (A 2^D view is actually one
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of many types of 3D displays. Chapter V describes some of
these, including 2 lAD.) Because NEMESIS is designed for the
E-2C, the designers realized the importance of altitude in
the situational picture. They understood the negative
effects on performance of the operators by a third and
crucial dimension being stored in alpha-numerics usually off
the main display map. They knew that operators were
constantly trying to develop a mental picture and associate
altitudes with their two dimensional displays. They
understood the potential benefits of representing all three
dimensions in one intuitive display. In discussions with
some of the designers, the author encountered some who did
not believe there would be improved performance with the 2^D
display. To their credit, MT included the capability as a
response to user requests, inputs and feedback.
This 2 XAD view of NEMESIS is much more robust than the
side view of TADMUS DSS . TADMUS ' design was specifically
aimed at an Aegis ship in AAW. NEMESIS was designed to meet
the wide range of missions and air focus of the E-2C.
NEMESIS uses a side 2^D view with selectable looking
directions (north, south, east and west) . It also uses a
sliding scale for height of eye selection. The default
height of eye is 25,000 feet which is a typical height for
an E-2C station. The default look direction is to the

















Figure 23 2 1/£D View (Sharkey et al, 1997)
The user can create 2MD windows for any portion of the
main map display. This 2^D window can be selected by
specifying a geographic region in the main map window, or by
selecting tracks (usually intercepting aircraft) and
designating them for the 2^D display. The 2MD display then
automatically changes scales as necessary to keep the
selected tracks in view.
It is the author's firm belief that three dimensional
displays will follow the same path as color's incorporation
in displays. The price and complexity of color coupled with
numerous tests and studies that showed no significant
improvement in performance kept it out of displays for a
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long time. As the cost of color displays decreased and
users demands increased, color was incorporated. Only
recently is color widely accepted as a performance enhancer
in C2 systems.
Color and 3D are intuitive and real world to the user.
Like color enhancements only a few years ago, there are many
studies available that do not show improved performance with
3D displays. The user believes that with time and
refinement 3D displays will produce an improvement in
performance in airborne C2 systems. In fact, for some
specific tasks there are studies that show improved
performance with 3D displays (more on this in Chapter V)
.
7 . Track Alerts
Track alerts significantly aid the user in maintaining
the most up-to-date SA. These cues help the commander notice
changes in the picture more often and sooner, much like the
changing priority algorithm of the multi-CRO display panel
of DSS-2. This reduction in the commander's cognitive load
frees his mental resources for more critical decisions.
An example of reducing the cognitive load of the
commander is having the computer perform a simple function
of watching an airfield for departing aircraft . The
constant vigilance required by a human to notice a track
becoming airborne from a specific field is difficult to
maintain for a four to five hour mission, especially since
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other tasks and distractions are never ending during that
time. By using the alerts, the commander's focus can shift
to other tasks while the computer continues to monitor the
subject airfield. If a track is formed for an aircraft
taking off from the airfield of interest, the computer
alerts the commander. Other significant "examples of
alerts available in NEMESIS are (Sharkey et al, August
1997) :
• Contacts presumed to be commercial exiting
commercial corridors.
• Contacts exhibiting characteristics indicating
hostile intent (e.g., jinking, sensors associated
with weapons, coming within 60 NM of the carrier and
having a heading within 20 degrees of the ship)
.
• Contacts entering designated regions (e.g., going
north of a designated latitude)
.
• Aircraft approaching Bingo fuel state.
• Detection of new, unevaluated contact.
• Single contact splitting into multiple contacts.
• Geo/Pol boundaries.
• Intel/Elint based.
• Wing and/or CVBG SOP
• A/C under E-2C control entering radar envelope. 1 '
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8 . Communications
The designers felt that NEMESIS should contain
communications processing integrated into the rest of
NEMESIS even though the contract did not include a
communications processing requirement. One feature proposed
is the ability for the computer to answer simple requests
from other units. An example of a simple and routine
request might be a call for '"pigeons' 1 which is a request
from another aircraft for the range and bearing of
"Mom 11 (the carrier) . The designers of NEMESIS suggest that
with digitized communications and voice recognition the
computer could handle this simple request while allowing the
commander to focus on more complicated or urgent tasks.
Realizing the user's reluctance to let a computer answer
requests automatically, MT provides two modes. (1)
Management by consent would require the user to approve the
reply before it went out, or (2) management by negation
would let the computer answer, unless the user overrides the
reply. This implementation reduces user work load by
allowing the computer to perform a more mundane task.
Unfortunately, wide acceptance in the fleet may be difficult
to achieve.
Another proposal is that since all communications will
likely be digitized they could also be queued. However, the
author does not feel confident that a queue of
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communications with a necessary algorithm to determine
priority for presentation to the commander would provide
significant improvement in overall performance. The author
is concerned about time- lateness of communications in the
queue
.
The storage and saving of communications as a reference
would however provide valuable assistance. The queue would
be good for repeating missed calls or showing a message as
text if necessary.
The author feels that the users would be better served
with 3D sound that would allow them to improve current
abilities to listen to multiple radios at the same time. A
skilled commander in the E-2C has the ability to listen to
multiple radios at the same time.
The designers propose that the users could view the
queue to change the order of waiting communications if
necessary. This proposal seems to have the potential to
increase load on the user. Where the user used to manage
the radios by simple listening, the proposal would entail
not only listening, but having to systematically inspect
queues and repeatedly reconsider priorities.
More proposals involve those features similar to the
Navy's proposed Automatic Digital Network System (ADNS)
involving designating the recipients of communications via
any number of means and letting the computer figure out how
to transmit the message to those intended recipients.
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Likewise, the system could identify the platform in the
display map or MTI that is generating an incoming
communication
.
Another result of this type of communications control
is the ability to have "smart" volume control for users in
the E-2C. Users would be able to specify volume based on
almost any factor (examples include fighters, AW, other
squadron aircraft, other AEW aircraft) . The computer would
sort communications and set volumes dynamically.
Aside from the queues these features have some obvious
potential benefits, but only time will tell if voice
recognition and computer controlled communication paths
become a reality.
9 . Replay
The replay feature may be useful for training, debriefs
and to uncover missed events or lost tracks. One nice
feature included in replay is a personal time marker. In
addition to recorded time, the user can simply verbally mark
a point in the flight for future reference. Later in the
flight or on deck, he can refer to his personal time marker
for further analysis of the mission.
10. 3D Sound
Spatially separated communications improve the
performance of listeners. 3D sound can be presented to the
user in many ways. An important description of each is
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included from Sharkey et al, 1997, Design Guide 16. "The
frame of reference refers to the coordinate system used to
define the location from which voice communications
originate. There are three (3) candidate systems:
A head-referenced system will localize sounds relative
to the current position of the NFO's head. For example, a
sound might always be presented forward and to the left of
the NFO's head regardless of the direction the NFO was
looking at that instant. With a head-referenced system a
sound will appear to move relative to the aircraft as the
NFO's head turns or rolls. A head referenced system does
not require tracking the position of the NFO's head.
Furthermore, a head-referenced presentation technique does
not require knowledge of the aircraft's position or
orientation relative to the platform sending the voice
message
.
An aircraft-referenced system presents sounds so that
they always appear to be originating from the same location
relative to the aircraft and its equipment regardless of
motion of the NFO's head. A sound that appears to originate
from forward on the port side of the aircraft when the NFO
is looking straight ahead, for example, will not seem to
move as the NFO's head turns or rolls with an aircraft-
referenced system. An aircraft-referenced system requires
that the position of the NFO's head be tracked and taken
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into account when presenting sounds directionally . An
aircraft referenced system does not require taking the
position or orientation of the E-2C relative to the calling
platform into account.
A world- referenced presentation technique would result
in sound appearing to originate from consistent geographical
positions. For example, if the platform sending a voice
message to the E-2C was due south, then the voice would
appear to come from the south. This techniques requires
that the NFO ' s head position and the position and
orientation of the aircraft relative to the communicating
platform be known and used to generate the sound. Unlike
the other two referencing systems, world-referencing may
result in voice communications from different platforms
being perceived as coming from the same direction. (For
example, when two platforms are at different distances from
the E-2C, but both are to the south." (Sharkey et al, 1997)
NEMESIS proposes at least four sources for sound
directions. These minimum four directions are depicted in
Figure 24. These directions are forward right and left and
rear right and left.
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Figure 24 Minimum of Four Directions (Sharkey et al, 1997)
11. Report Generation
NEMESIS automates report generation. Almost any type
of report can be generated quickly if not automatically with
little or no inputs required from the users. Vast
improvements in maintenance could be realized by automated
BIT reports being sent back to the squadron maintenance
department aboard the carrier in real-time. Currently,
faults are reported back to the maintenance department via
voice as the mission loading permits or via extensive and
timely post flight debriefs. Post flight debriefs can be of
limited value due to an inability to reproduce the fault on
deck for the technician to see. This assumes improved
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connectivity with the carrier and new more capable computers
in the squadron maintenance department
.
12. Window Passing
NEMESIS includes the ability to send and receive
windows from others. This concept was first proposed in
early nineties. The object oriented architecture and
communications infrastructure needed for window passing are
now being implemented under the programs Athena and CEC
respectively (Dick B., 1998) . This ability allows operators
to hand off tasks to another operator in the CIC or even on
another platform. This feature enables dynamic task
loading, while minimizing user setup and the time required
to acquire SA in a new situation. With this method, the
accepting user receives a preprocessed fully setup window.
Manual and cognitive load is dramatically reduced. NEMESIS
envisions this ability to transfer windows to any unit in
the force, thus allowing dynamic loading across the entire
force and maximize performance by avoiding overload on any
one unit or individual
.
C . SUGGESTIONS
NEMESIS was designed from the start for the E-2C from
task analyses and input from E-2C users. Because of the
excellent job done designing the HMI, the author can offer
only limited concerns:
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• Track balls or mice prove inefficient in large
display spaces.
• Ergonomics of a touch- screen application on such a
large surface for a five hour mission (or longer if
the platform adds a refueling capability)
.
• It may be difficult to strike a balance between
mission specific setup and personal setup.
• Research, such as that done by Dr. Glen Osga (Osga
G, 1995) , suggests FABs are more efficient than
VABs . Groupings, color-coding and symbols help
along with great human ability with spatial memory.
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V. 3D DISPLAYS
In previous chapters the author discussed different
types of three dimensional displays. This chapter provides
definitions and analysis of some 3D displays.
A. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Some basic ideas and terminology for three-dimensional
displays are provided here. Physiologi cal cues are
properties of the optical apparatus. Kinetic cues involve
the relative movements of objects and observers. Pictorial
cues are the scene attributes that convey the impression of
depth. Of these cues Dember and Warm state "In order to
achieve an awareness of depth, it is clear that we use a
wide variety of cues, no one of which is itself three
dimensional' ' (Dember & Warm 1979) .
Descriptions of three types of 3D displays follow:
1. 3D Perspective Display (often referred to as 2VSD) -
offers a more natural view or representation of the
airspace. This method presents distance along the line
of sight, similar to human visual systems. A variety
of pictorial cues are used to give the impression of
3D.
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2. 3D Stereoscopic Display (3D Stereo) - uses a
computer-generated, fixed focus view to the plane of
the screen with stereo glasses.
3. 3D Volumetric Display (3DVD) - is an evolving
technology that uses more salient 3D depth cues like
motion parallax, binocular disparity-stereopsis,
physiological cues and pictorial to present a 360
degree scene.
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF 3D
DISPLAYS
The problem associated with most current three
dimensional displays is the viewpoint of the user. The data
can be presented with any viewpoint. The problem is which
viewpoint to use for each viewer for a given scenario. If
designers allow the user to change the viewpoint
dynamically, the user can lose his bearings or get confused
as to which direction he is looking. If designers freeze
each viewer's direction of look, then the commander may not
be able to clearly comprehend certain scenarios that could
be quickly understood from a different viewpoint.
"The compellingness of the sense of depth in a display
is a roughly additive function of the number of depth cues
that are incorporated into it and certain cues are more
salient than others.' 1 (Stokes et al, 1990) This need for a
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maximum number of cues in a dynamic battlespace depiction
will push the limits of technology and expense. Complicated
algorithms may be required to present the information with
as many cues as possible depending on a number of variables.
Each of the 3D display options has unique advantages




• no need for goggles or glasses
• unambiguous presentation of altitude and geo-
position without changing viewing position
• smaller footprint than volumetric
• does not require a 3D hooking device.
Disadvantages
• introduces clutter that could make a congested
battlespace depiction difficult to decipher.
• altitude and geo-position not presented
concurrently





• feeling that the operator is not missing
anything.
Disadvantages
• does not improve performance on a dynamic task
in a rich visual environment over that of a
similar display without stereopsis.
• Also, the ability to see stereoscopic depth on
a CRT must be learned.
• need a dichoptic presentation
• ambiguity between geo-position and altitude
resolved by moving the user
• glasses or goggles probably required
• inherent conflict between depth cues
• some people are stereo blind.
3. 3DVD
Advantages
• no need for goggles or glasses
• show geographic and altitude simultaneously.
Disadvantages
• is still in its infancy. The problems it has
been applied to have been simple, and more work




• The questionable value added by current versions
does not justify the large footprint of the
system, especially for airborne commanders.
• difficult to determine altitude from some
positions
• level of resolution is not good enough yet.
C. A ROTATABLE WORLD AND TWO STUDIES OF PERFORMANCE ACROSS
DISPLAYS
A technology referenced and requested by users
canvassed by Monterey Technologies was the ability to "roll
the world' 1 as they had seen in Tactical Aircrew Combat
Training System (TACTS) debriefing room. These debriefing
rooms are located at various fleet training locations and
provide extensive re-creation of flights for debriefing
purposes. The selling point of the TACTS range debriefing
room is the ability to roll the bird's eye (perpendicular to
the earth's surface) viewing angle ninety degrees until you
are looking parallel to the earth's surface. This allows
the viewers to see the situation in relation to altitude
without having to look at another screen or window. As the
scene is rolled the viewers maintain SA and gain still more
understanding and knowledge of the picture. This instantly
added understanding could be in the form of an enemy's
tactics, terrain masking, etc.
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The designers of NEMESIS considered many different
types of 2D and 3D displays. They decided that the
perspective display was best suited for the E-2C. The
author agrees, but with the acknowledgment that rapid
advances in technology may enable the other methods to be
refined or improved to the point that their disadvantages
are reduced while maintaining their advantages over
perspective
.
In fact, a recent study by Dr. Jim Broyles (Broyles, in
press) of SPAWARS comparing different types of 3D displays
across a selected set of air traffic control tasks scored
perspective the lowest of all the types of 3D displays
tested. In this study 2^D (perspective) displays scored
poorly compared to the other types of 3D (volumetric, stereo)
and even 2D displays. The author has provided multiple
reasons why in a tactical command and control aircraft 2D
displays are insufficient. In section B of this chapter the
author presented other considerations involving the
implementation of 3D displays in the E-2C CIC that strongly
supported the perspective implementation. Next the author
will explain why the results of Broyles' experiment do map
directly to the needs of the crew in the E-2C or other
command and control platforms.
The results of the Broyles study are limited to simple
air traffic control tasks performed one at a time. These
tasks include speed judgments, heading judgments, altitude
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judgments, aircraft vectoring and deconf liction decisions.
These task represent a small portion of only one function
performed by the E-2C crew. Additionally, the tasks in the
experiment were not done simultaneously. When one takes
into consideration the multitude of simultaneous tasks and
decisions performed by E-2C commanders, the poor performance
of the perspective display in these few tasks does not weigh
heavily for command and control platforms. This fact
coupled with the limitations of stereo and volumetric
displays, the perspective display becomes a compelling
choice. The designers of NEMESIS reached the same
conclusion.
Another study more closely matched to tasks of the E-2C
CIC crew was reported in Human Factors . "Operator
Performance as a Function of Type of Display: Conventional
versus Perspective ' by Bemis, Leeds and Winer (Bemis et al,
1988) compared detection of air threats, selection of
nearest interceptor and time required to choose the
interceptor for a standard 2D NTDS display and a perspective
display. The results of the study showed significant
reductions in errors of detection and interceptor selection
as well as response time when using the perspective (2^D)
display.
One other possible option could be a function similar
to that of the TACTS range, the ability to rotate the view
from perpendicular to parallel to the earth's surface. This
75
solution would require the user to constantly manipulate his
screen from one view to another. Although it happens in the
same window, it is an intermediate step between multiple two
dimensional displays (that require more processing by the
commander to understand) and a three dimensional picture
(with lower cognitive load)
.
There is no doubt for any tactical flyer that the TACTS
range ' s "world rotate ' feature adds immense rapid
understanding of the 3D tactical situation. This feature of
TACTS is enabled by real-time transmission of kinematic data
by the participating aircraft. Improved technology in the
form of advanced sensors and communications has enabled our
forces to gather a similar quantity and quality of
information on almost any track concerning the force. This
detailed information allows us to present a accurate
depiction of the situation in a form that enhances the




Joint Pub 6-0 states "..information should be
relevant, essential, timely and in a form that warriors can
quickly understand and can use to act. " (Joint Pub 6-0,
1995)
In that aim, the best way to depict a three dimensional
environment is with some form of three dimensional decision
aid. Displays have slowly progressed away from textual
presentations and towards more quickly and easily
assimilated graphic displays. Unfortunately, many current
command and control decision support systems still rely on
text or multiple two dimensional windows to provide all
three dimensions of the real world to the commander.
In the past, these less than optimal implementations
were unavoidable due to technological limitations. These
technological limitations have been overcome for some types
of 3D displays. Because commanders in airborne command and
control platforms require a detailed understanding of a
three dimensional environment, they should adopt some type
of 3D display quickly. Perspective displays are not perfect
for absolutely every situation the commander will face; but
the added rapid understanding of the action, tactics and
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